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A

LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: DETENTE, ENTENTE,
OR CONCOMITANCE?
David W. Louisellt and Bernard L. Diamond$
The plethora of books, articles, and symposia on law and psychiatry
since the Durham case' have advanced the ball only a short distance
toward the goal of a shared modus operandi-oreven a modus vivendifor these two departments of human learning. Perhaps a reason why a
touchdown is still beyond the horizon is that the chief protagonists persist
in framing the issues on the chalk board of the free-will-determinism
abstraction rather than on the gridiron of reality. Thus Jerome Hall
recently has said again:
Viewing the contemporary scene from the perspective of a common lawyer,
I see a fateful conflict between a powerful movement of thought and the
common sense of law.... Is it an advance in understanding to interpret
philosophy and the lives of great men in terms of the Oedipus Complex,2
or does that merely confuse meanings with facts and problematic origins?
And from a psychiatrist, discussing the definition proposed in substitution for that of the M'Naghten case3 by the California Commission on
Insanity and Criminal Offenders,4 comes almost as a taunt the incessant
proclamation: "Determinism, which is the fundamental tenet of all
science, is violated by the assumption that an individual can wilfully
elect to commit an act which, in fact, is the result of causal antecedents." 5
The lawyer's facile attribution to the law of a rigid free-will posture
has its counterpart not only in extremism by psychiatrists but by sociologists as well. Recently Barbara Wootton has argued that since the object
of the criminal process is not punishment but prevention, we should
abandon mens rea as a factor of convictability although retaining it for
purposes of personal and social therapy 6 -subordinating the moral significance of the fact that those treated however humanely under such an
t B.S.L. 1935, LL.B. 1938, University of Minnesota. Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt Professor
of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Professor Louisell expresses his appreciation
to the Ford Foundation whose grant enabled him to consult abroad with psychiatrists,
psychologists, lawyers, judges, criminologists and other scholars in this field. He also
thanks New York University Law School for a Walter E. Meyer Research Professorship
which facilitated his participation in related work there.
$ M.D., Professor of Criminology and Law, University of California, Berkeley; Assistant
Chief of Psychiatry, Mt. Zion Hospital, San Francisco.
1 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2 Hall, "Science, Common Sense, and Criminal Law Reform," 49 Iowa L. Rev. 1044
(1964).
3 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
4 Report by California Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders 26
(1st Report, July 7, 1962).
5 McGaughey, "Insanity and Criminal Offenders," 99 California Medicine 318 (1963).
6 Wootten, Crime and the Criminal Law 52-53 (1963).
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approach would nevertheless be treated as convicts. Even one optimistic
enough to title law's confrontation with psychiatry as "Cold War or
Entente Cordiale?" frames the issue in polar terms: "A basic ethical and
psychological stumbling block in an analysis of crucial problems of substantive Criminal Law and of sentencing policy is the ancient enigma
about whether man possesses 'freedom of will' or is instead the deluded
plaything of deterministic forces completely and always beyond his
'7
control."
To us, the stark dichotomy is misleading, or in any event not constructively meaningful. Our law is not, and at least for centuries has not been,
absolutist in its application of notions of free will to the defendant at the
criminal bar. The law does not adopt the viewpoint of extreme libertarianism. Its concept of mens rea proceeds from a theology fully aware of
determinants of conduct which potentially reduce or wholly destroy
responsibility such as fear, passion and ignorance.' St. Thomas' prescription of criteria relevant to responsibility for acts might well serve as a
general check list for the psychoanalyst:
For in acts we must take note of who did it, by what aids or instruments
he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he did it, how and when he did
Glueck, Law and Psychiatry: Cold War on Entente Cordiale? 5-6 (1962).
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (1st complete U.S. ed., literally translated
by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1947):
[Flor what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a
man he is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethiciii 1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply voluntary,
but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
2 id. at 1722 (pt. 11-11, q. 125, art. 4).
But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason
and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being
stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous temptation,
wherefore he is less to be blamed.
1 id. at 914 (pt. 1-11, q. 73, art. 6, reply obj. 2).
In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal
becomes venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason,
which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to
sudden movements of unbelief.
1 id. at. 982 (pt. 1-11, q. 88, art. 2).
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the
imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfill the conditions of
a moral act, since it is not deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we
have said. above (A.2). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate
reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is
that by such subtraction the species of the act is destroyed.
1 id. at 985" (pt. 1-11, q. 88, art. 6).
If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an
imbecile, then he that commits fornication in a state of such like ignorance, commits
no sin either mortal or venial.
Ibid. (reply obj. 2).
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. F6r some are disposed by their own bodily
temperament to chastity or meekness or such like.
1 id. at 804 (pt. 1-11, q. 51, art. 1).
7
8

1965]

LAW AND PSYCHIATRY

it. But Aristotle in Ethic iii. 1 adds yet another, to wit, about what which
Tully includes in the circumstance what.9

Perhaps historically the common law has not been as ready to mitigate
or excuse as the moral theologian. "Our general tendency, I think, is to

hold an offender legally responsible when we are in doubt about whether
he is morally responsible." 10 Chief Judge Bazelon recently furnished a

clue to the reasons for differing standards in pointing out that whereas
law assesses responsibility in order to punish, moral theology does so as

a condition of forgiveness." But even so, our law has followed closely
in theology's wake from the ancient idea of the "dethronement of reason" through M'Naghten, 2 Wells, 3 Durham'4 and Gorshen.15 All the
relevant tests and concepts-right-wrong, irresistible impulse, product of
mental disease or defect, heat of passion, coercion, reduced responsibility
-bear witness that the law is no absolutist in applying the philosopher's
posit of free will.
On the other side, it is a mistake to assume that the Freudian psychoanalyst with his emphasis on the specific psychodynamic determinants of
behavior abrogates all concept of individual responsibility. Actually, it is
an essential part of the value system of psychoanalytic therapy that the
individual be willing to accept more responsibility for himself and his
behavior than society ordinarily assigns. The psychoanalyst insists that
the individual must accept responsibility for his own unconscious as well
as for his conscious thinking.' As stated by Freud:
Obviously one must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one's
dreams. What else is one to do with them? Unless the content of the dream
(rightly understood) is inspired by alien spirits, it is a part of my own
being. If I seek to classify the impulses that are present in me according to
social standards into good and bad, I must assume responsibility for both
sorts; and if, in defence, I say that what is unknown, unconscious and
repressed in me is not my "ego," then I shall not be basing my position
upon psycho-analysis.... The physician will leave it to the jurist to construct for social purposes
7 a responsibility that is artificially limited to the

metapsychological ego.'

9 1 id. at 624 (pt. 1-11, q. 7, art. 3). Note St. Paul's statement of the free-will versus
determinism dilemma: "For I do not the good that I wish, but the evil that I do
not wish, that I perform. Now if I do what I do not wish, it is no longer I who do it,
but the sin" that dwells in me." Romans 7:19-20.
10 Raab, "A Moralist Looks at the Durham and M'Naghten Rules," 46 Minn. L. Rev.
327, 330 (1961).
11 Bazelon, "The Future of Reform in the Administration of Criminal justice," 35 F.R.D.
100, 103 (1964).
12 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
'3 People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); see Louisell & Hazard, "Insanity
as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial," 49 Calif. L. Rev. 805, 816 (1961).
14 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d. 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see Diamond, "Criminal
Responsibility of the Mentally I1," 14 Stan. L. Rev. 59, 66 (1961).
15 People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
16 The German "Ich" here stands for something more like the English "self."
17 Freud, "Moral Responsibility for the Content of Dreams," in 19 Complete Psychologi-
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There is still lacking in the psychoanalytic, psychiatric or' psychologic
literature a simple and comprehensible statement of the problem of individual choice, decision, volition and moral responsibility which could be
applied directly to the decision-making processes of the law. Certainly
there is no consensus among the scientific community about these issues
with which the law is so directly concerned. The hope expressed in 1955
by Gitelson that psychoanalytic advances may bring us really fundamental insights "into the problem of adaptation as it is related to determinism and free will," 8 is yet to be fulfilled.' 9
cal Works of Sigmund Freud 131 (Stanford ed. 1961). Freud was very pessimistic about
the application of psychoanalysis to the law. For discussion of Freud's attitudes towards
the legal process, see Diamond, supra note 14, at 63. He probably would have been
skeptical of the value of any attempts to integrate legal, moral and psychoanalytic
concepts. Freud's caution served for many years to justify the psychoanalysts' detachment
from any practical application of their theories and clinical experience to the legal process.
Nevertheless, the temptation for analysts to at least speculate about the legal and moral
implications of their theories was very great. It was inevitable that those psychoanalytic insights which proved fruitful in their implications to art, literature, psychology,
anthropology, sociology and to medicine, should also be applied to law and criminology.
The psychoanalyst Alexander collaborated with the jurist Staub in 1929 to produce the
first penetrating analytic study of the judicial process, Alexander & Staub, "Der Verbrecher
und seine Richter," ein Psychoanalytischer Einblick in die Welt der Paragraphen (1929),
translated as The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public (1931). Since 1929 a vast array of
publications by psychoanalysts have appeared representing a wide variety of speculations
and theorizing about morality, responsibility, and the law. The most recent publications
have ranged from an attack by Szasz upon the current institution of legal psychiatry and
the use of the mental health ethic as a device for authoritarian social control, Szasz, Law,
Liberty and Psychiatry (1963) to a group of supportive lectures on "the ethical implications of psychoanalytic insight" by Erickson, Insight and Responsibility (1964).
18 Gitelson, "Psychoanalyst, U.S.A. 1955," 112 American J. Psychiatry 700 (1956):
Modern neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, cybernetics, animal psychology and the other
natural sciences create the climate in which psychoanalysis exists today. Inevitably
this affects its context, or, as some might say, the "field" of its operation. We can now
have hope that the more recent advances in psychoanalysis, particularly in ego
psychology, against this background, may bring us really fundamental insights into the
individual nature of men and particularly into the problem of adaptation as it is
related to determinism and free will. To the extent to which we do this we are also
brought closer to a real solution of the living problems whose present insistence
evokes our hectic improvisations.
19 The current down-grading of psychoanalysis, particularly for forensic purposes, observed by Professor Louisell in various places in Europe was chiefly explained by the
European psychiatrists and others by (1) its expensiveness, as implied by the semi-jocular
comment--"It's all right for you rich Americans, but we can't afford such luxuries"; (2) an
increasing skepticism about its relative value for individual diagnosis as compared to
other methods (which would not necessarily imply its denigration as a tool of social
understanding); and (3) the general reorientation of European psychiatry towards
neurology and biochemistry. See Sargent, "Psychiatric Treatment Here and in England,"
214 Atlantic Monthly 88 (July 1964); Sargent, "Disturbed Americans: Criticisms and
Comments," id. at 90 (Oct. 1964). It seems more likely, however, that the key or at
least most apparent factor in the decline of psychoanalysis on the European continent
was the squeeze between the Nazi oppression of psychoanalysis as a "Jewish psychology"
and the Communist position that psychoanalysis is anti-Marxist. Continental Europe was
depleted of psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic training centers by the concentration
camps or by emigration principally to the United States, England, and Israel. It is only
in recent years that small groups of Freudian analysts in such countries as Holland and
France have been able to resume activities. But in the meanwhile the void left by European
psychoanalysis has been filled by the Pavlovian psychiatry of the iron curtain countries
or the existentialism psychiatry of Germany, Switzerland and France. See generally Barton,
Farrell, Lenehan & McLaughlin, Impressions of European Psychiatry (1961); Bellak, Con-
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Attempts to state a modus vivendi for psychoanalyst and moralist
inevitably reflect the emphasis of each viewpoint. Thus John Hospers
says:
If practicing psychoanalysts were asked this question [Is there, taking
into account psychoanalysis' extension of the notion of compulsion to
include determination by unconscious forces, any freedom left in human
behavior?] there is little doubt their answer would be along the following
lines: they would say that they were not accustomed to using the term
"free" at all, but if they had to suggest a criterion for distinguishing the
free from the unfree, they would say that a person's freedom is present
in inverse proportion to his neuroticism; in other words, the more his
acts are determined by a malevolent unconscious, the less free he is. Thus
they would speak of degrees of freedom. They would say that as a person
is cured of his neurosis, he becomes more free-free to realize capabilities
well-adthat were blocked by the neurotic affliction. The psychologically
justed individual is in this sense comparatively the most free.2 0
On the other hand, Choisy puts it: "Liberty is born when determinisms
are totally integrated. Freudian determinism is the liberty to create by
starting out from mechanisms known and accepted."'"
About the most we feel able to agree upon-but we think it enough for
practical interprofessional cooperation-is that there is ample evidence
from psychoanalysis, psychiatry and the other behavioral sciences that
the more free the individual is from the internal pressures of psychopathology and the less he is burdened with the detrimental forces of adverse
social, economic and cultural conditions, the more he is able to make
choices and decisions, to select among alternative patterns of behavior, in
a manner which appears to approximate our traditional notion of free
22

will.

temporary European Psychiatry (1961); May, Angel & Ellenberger, Existence, A New
Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (1958); Winn, Psychotherapy in the Soviet Union
(1962).
20 Hospers, "Free-Will and Psychoanalysis," in Readings in Ethical Theory 560, 574-75
(1952). Cf. Knight, "Determinism, Freedom, and Psychotherapy," in 1 Psychoanalytic
Psychiatry and Psychology 365 (Friedman ed. 1954). However intellectually unsatisfying
the psychoanalytic assaults on the free-will-determinism dilemma may be, can one
fairly conclude that the philosopher has done much better? Or the theologian, e.g., in
reconciling Divine prescience with human freedom? Perhaps the fact of greatest practical
significance for present purposes is that the classical argument for freedom of most direct
import for society, that the moral law subsumes freedom, has in psychoanalytic theory
a pragmatic counterpart in that "there exist in the deeper layers of the mind the strongest,
and probably ineradicable, motives creating what may be called the 'sense of free will,'
closely connected with the sense of personality itself and retained so long as this is
retained, i.e., until insanity, delirium, or death dissolve it." 2 Jones, Essays in Applied
Psychoanalysis 186 (1951).
21 Choisy, "Psychoanalysis and Catholicism" in 1 Cross Currents 75, 82 (No. 3, Spring
1951).
22 So long as "blameworthiness" is for society the cornerstone of criminal responsibility
the law must acknowledge that those persons who lack the capacity or the opportunity for
choice and decision-all those who are not masters of their own ships--cannot be held
to the same standard of accountability as the generality of mankind. Clearly the law has
already accepted this principle insofar as it concerns the mentally ill, e.g., Durham v.
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May not, therefore, the lawyer and the psychiatrist pretermit the freewill-determinism dilemma and get on with the practical business of society? "The real question, from the point of view of science in general
and psychology in particular, is not whether there is such a thing as
human freedom, but rather how much of it there is, and wherein it
consists."23 And from the juridical viewpoint the practically significant
question is, what if any determinants of human conduct does the law
assimilate as relevant to the assessment of responsibility? Law's confrontation with psychiatry is rendered meaningful and seminal by inquiry
as to what determinants the two disciplines hold in common to be rele24
vant, wherein their appraisals differ, and why.
The selection of and relative emphasis upon determinants of conduct
considered to be significant, whether by law or psychiatry, is largely a
function of the assumed purpose, goal or potential of the criminal law.
Whether one believes primarily in deterrence, retribution or rehabilitation
largely governs his selection and classification of the determinants that
he is willing to take into account. The choices and emphases do not so
much separate the lawyer and the psychiatrist as such, as they divide men
generally according to their individual philosophies, religions, temperaments and life experiences. It is therefore well to refresh recollection as
to the chief approaches to the criminal law's problem of punishment.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 123, 394 P.2d
959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959);
People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1961); Diamond, "From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond," 50 Calif. L. Rev.
189 (1962). It remains to be seen whether society can afford and the law assimilate the
idea that cultural and economic deprivation may at least partially deprive certain
individuals of their capacity for volitional choice and so negate or diminish their criminal
responsibility.
23 "Free Will," 9 Encyclopedia Britannica 747 (1948).
24 Possibly supportive of the feasibility of the consensus we urge is the argument of
Ernest Jones "that in practical daily life it does not seem to make any difference whether
a given person, community or religion adopts one or the other belief, in free will or
determinism." 2 Jones, supra note 20, at 180. He goes on to state:
The Babylonians, who firmly believed that one's destiny was .fixed at birth by the
influence of the stars then in conjunction, were not in the least a fatalistic people, as
one might have expected, but on the contrary a people full of enterprise and initiative
with evident powers of original thought. The Calvinists who hold to predestination
strive to lead as good a life as other Christians, although theoretically it would appear
to be irrelevant to their fate in the next life. The part played in Greek tragedy by
Fate, from which there was no escape, does not prevent the struggles and conflicts
there depicted from being of just the same order as in a modern drama. The determinist
Stoics were as set on following the path of duty and leading a moral life as the
libertarian Epicureans. ...
Similarly with the philosopher. No one could say that Spinoza, Leibnitz, David
Hume and John Stuart Mill, convinced determinists, led a restricted life or strove
less than other people to perfect their character and ethical behavior.
Id. at 180-81. Quaere, whether the foregoing observations apply as much to belief as to
profession of belief. The fact that most people act as if they could in a measure control
their destiny, whatever they profess, accords with one of the predicates of the classic
arguments for free will, viz., the universality of belief in duty and moral obligations.
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(1) Deterrence. This utilitarian approach justifies punishment of the
criminal in order to deter others (and the criminal himself). A recent
exposition from the sociological viewpoint appears in Barbara Wootton's
"Crime and the Criminal Law."2 5 Deterrence embraces concepts of social
defense or protection, and the instillation and alleviation of fear.25
(2) Balancing the scales of justice: retribution. Of all theories of
penal sanction this concept probably most sharply separates the psychoanalyst and the moralist. For the former, it is essentially a remnant of
superstition;2 7 for the latter, it may be a condition of expiation and therefore of the fulfillment of justice.28 But an accommodation adequate to the
needs of society lies in the fact that the psychoanalyst, however much he
may deprecate retribution as a goal, acknowledges the practical uni29
versality of the demand for it and hence its pragmatic importance.
And the moralist must realize that not to hold the instinct in leash is to
commit the sacrilege of playing God. "Vengeance is mine; I will repay,
says the Lord."8 0 Significant to the accommodation is the increasing social
awareness of the possibilities of distinction between "crime," which is
within society's competence, and "sin," within only conscience's domain.31
25 Wootton, supra note 6.
26 See Zilboorg, The Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment 27, 77 (1954);
Ehrenzweig, "A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea-Clues to the Problems of Criminal
Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell," 73 Yale L.. 425, 433-39 (1964).
27 "The superstition is by no means dead, even among civilised persons. There are
many people today who habitually regard every calamity as some kind of retribution
for guilt ....
[T~he naive mind is always seeking for an explanation [of the cruel chances
of life], and if it cannot find one in nature itself, it will readily supply an imaginary one
of an anthropomorphic kind. I cannot help believing that notions of retributive punishment really belong to the same order of thinking-or, more accurately perhaps, of feeling."
Allen, Aspects of justice 20-21 (1958).
28 Leviticus 24:20; Mercier, Criminal Responsibility 16 (1905); Edward Fry, quoted in
Mercier, supra, at 13; cf. the attitude of the legal historian, 2 Stephen, History of the
Criminal Law of England 81-82, 91 (1883):
I think ... that criminals should be hated, that the punishments inflicted upon
them should be so contrived as to give expression to that hatred . . . . [T]here are
in the world a considerable number of extremely wicked people, disposed, when
opportunity offers, to get what they want by force or fraud . . . . Such persons,
I think ought in extreme cases to be destroyed.
See Yardley, "Current Attitudes to Capital Punishment 11," 4 The Lawyer No. 2, 33, 34
(1961): "There is nothing inherently wrong in the idea of retribution as the basis of
punisbment . . . . Is it not proper that the disapproval of society . . . should be shown
by the severity of the punishment, so that murder . . . is punished by death? . .. [T]he
revulsion of English society should be suitably expressed." Compare Traynor, J. in People
v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 856, 350 P.2d 705, 713 (1960).
29 Pretermitting the problem of the moral justification for retribution, the psychoanalyst
points out that there is a deep seated instinct in man that, when evil has occurred, it
can somehow be neutralized by some gesture of equivalence; that the process of "noxa"
has been common in many systems. As explanation in psychoanalytic terms is that
retribution justifies, for example, the death penalty as a vicarious punishment for crimes
committed vicariously; punishment gives the law-abiding a release. Hazard & Louisell,
"Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution," 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 381, 386 (1962).
SO "Do not avenge yourselves, beloved, but give place to the wrath, for it is written,
Vengeance is mine; I will repay, says the Lord." St. Paul, Romans 12:19; see also
Deuteronomy 32:35; Hebrews 10:30.
81 "But where private practices cannot affect anybody but the voluntary adult actors,
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(3) Segregation. This concept in its simplest meaning is clear: criminals too dangerous to be at large should be confined until safe, or at
least for a definite period. But the psychiatrist often perceives in it a.
deeper significance, the notion of the criminal as an outcast different in
essence as well as in activity from others; as a pariah who contaminates
society and must therefore be isolated. Dissenting from this notion, the
psychiatrist may unconsciously fall into the role of combatant for the
custody of the defendant, a challenger of the legitimacy of the court's
claim to the exercise of society's control. The court may react by restricting psychiatric evidence or otherwise diminishing the impact of the potential psychiatric contribution and by stressing other goals such as deterrence or retribution. Soon judge and psychiatrist, at least unconsciously,
cast each other in the role of "enemy" and cooperative communication
is impeded. Finally, the judge effects his power to exercise society's control of the defendant; the psychiatrist arbitrarily rejects the decision of
the court; the block is complete. The solution to this impasse is for
psychiatrists to realize objectively and state frankly that they have no
legitimate claim to the custody of defendants, and for judges to recognize
that psychiatric testimony is not a threat to legal supremacy and the
right to custody but only an aid to their more intelligent exercise. The
problem for both judge and psychiatrist is at root a moral one: the
subordination of hubris.
(4) Political control. This approach sees the criminal law as the agent
of political power. Its most extreme modern exponents have of course
been Nazism and Communism. A classic tenet of Communism is that the
law of any given age is a function of the way in which economic power
32
is distributed in that age.
(5) Rehabilitation. This goal is founded upon the medical notion of
treatment or therapy, with the objective of restoration of the criminal to
the community as efficiently, promptly and securely as possible. Punishment for retributive purposes is impermissible or in any event irrelevant;
it is valid only insofar as it is therapeutically helpful. In this area the
lawyer may see the psychiatrist as the potential victim of labeling, and
point out that "hospitalization" when involuntary may be as confining,
and hence as disruptive of liberty, as "imprisonment."' As Fuller rethe mere dislike of what is being done by others, or even the knowledge that others harm
themselves by what they do, provides no legitimate ground for coercion." Hayek, The
Constitution of Liberty 145 (1960). But quaere, whether in this connection the social
scientists are paying enough attention to the educative significance of rules of law. See
St. John-Stevas, Life, Death and the Law 35-49 (1961).
32 See Sutherland & Cressey, Principles of Criminology 305 (6th ed. 1960).
33 See LouiseU, "The Psychologist in Today's Legal World," 39 Minn. L. Rev. 235, 258
n.66 (1955).
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cently put it, "When ...rehabilitation is taken as the exclusive aim of
the criminal law, all concern about due process and a clear definition
of what is criminal may be lost. If the worst that can happen to the defendant is that he should be given a chance to have himself improved at
public expense, why all the worry about a fair trial?" 4 The resolution
lies in adequate and judicially enforceable protection against involuntary
confinement arbitrarily imposed under whatever label. Rehabilitation
reflects not only the medical notion of treatment but also the theological
concept of repentance and forgiveness. For whatever philosophic underpinnings of rehabilitation may be subsumed-whether deterministic or
free-will-its effectuation seems generally accordant with theology's concept of forgiveness consequent upon contrition and commitment to
reformation.
(6) Certainty and objectivity vs. individualization. The psychiatrist,
clinically observant of varieties of influences on human conduct as multifarious as the experiences of the unconscious, views each patient as a
unique problem, each man as a law unto himself. He is apt to see in the
lawyer's quest for objective norms and certainty of result only indication
that men "have not yet relinquished the childish need for an authoritative
father and unconsciously have tried to find in the law a substitute for
those attributes of firmness, sureness, certainty and infallibility ascribed
in childhood to the father. 3 5 But the lawyer sees objective standards as
the sine qua non of liberty-"Discretion is a softer word for arbitrary.", 6
This conflict well illustrates the concretization, on a meaningful experiential level, of the free-will-determinism dilemma. An aid to practical
accommodation is the realization that both the lawyer's commitment to
objective standards, and the psychiatrist's emphasis on individualization
of approach, have a common ultimate aim-the maximum fulfillment of
each person's worth and dignity, which may be only a synonym for
37
liberty.
The behavioral scientist places his emphasis and makes his value judgments upon what he conceives to be the observable and measurable phenomena of the world. He may even go so far, as has Piaget, to postulate
an "additional force" 3 8 -some quality or attribute which resides within
the individual-which tips the balance of choice and decision over and
above the ordinary determinants of the act. Piaget describes this "addi34 Fuller, The Morality of Law 165 (1964).
35 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 22 (Anchor ed. 1963).
36 Walcot's Case, K.B. 680, 90 Eng. Rep. 1275 (1793).
'S7 But the significance of the tug between objective standards, on the one hand, and
individualization of approach to the criminal, on the other, cannot be wished away. See
Louisell & Williams, The Parenchyma of Law 397-414 (1960).
38 Piaget "Will and Action," 26 Bull. Menninger Clinic 138 (1962).
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tional force" as arising "directly from the permanent scale of values"8 9
of the individual which, it is assumed, is in itself determined by the particular cultural influences and individual learning experiences of the
person.
The Christian theologian perhaps sees in this "additional force"-or at
least in that part of it which is not susceptible of materialistic analysis-a
power of divine origin which, by its very nature, is unmeasurable and
indescribable by the methods of material science. But even here, the theologian's idea of actual grace, a free gift of God which moves the will to
the good, produces a concept of "free will" not at all that of libertarianism
which would leave the will utterly unlimited, unfettered and uninfluenced.
While explanations as to the modus operandi of grace in relationship to
the will have varied from that of Pelagius to Calvin, the theological issue
which is pertinent to the law seems to be the relative significance of the
operation of grace on the final choice of its individual benefitee. Despite
the theological roots of our criminal law, the problem of grace as a
determinant appears too complex and mysterious for systematic juridical
attention, at least in a theologically pluralistic society. "The wind blows
where it will, and thou hearest its sound but dost not know where it comes
from or where it goes." 40 Certainly, the doctrine of grace as an element in
the exercise of the free will of the individual does not describe freedom
of the will as the logician's random choice. Rather, the Christian theologian insists that there may be determinants of choice which are outside
the realm of the natural sciences and which are divine in origin. It is
perhaps paradoxical that modern emphasis of scientific proof in the laboratory sense tends to denigrate alike "unscientific" psychoanalytic ob41
servation and spiritual experience as sources of human insights.
It is still true that sometimes judicial language dramatically, one might
say sloganistically, proclaims absolute free will as the cornerstone of
moral accountability.4 Irrespective of its absolutist proclamations, in
actual practice the law does not, and has probably never, conceived of
moral choice and decision as occurring in a philosophic vacuum. The
criminal law, sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly, does take into
consideration innumerable determinants of the criminal deed. For its own
historical reasons, the law chooses to maintain the fiction that motivation
is not an essential part of the definition of a crime. Yet motivation creeps
39 Id. at 145.
40
41
42

John 3:8.

Cf. Ward, Faith and Freedom 281 (1954).
E.g., People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 123, 130, 394 P. 2d 959, 971, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 283
(1964): "The doctrine of 'irresistible impulse' as a defense to crime is, of course, not the
law of California; to the contrary, the basic behavioral concept of our social order is
free will."
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into the criminal process in many ways, usually disguised as a hidden
element of the mens rea, as substantiating evidence of intent, design, and
malignancy of heart.
When the law ascribes a criminal act to a motivation of greed, avarice,
revenge, or moral depravity, is it not stating what it believes to be the
determinant of the crime? The logician can make out a good argument
that the only pure act of free will would be that decision which is made
entirely as a random choice. Hence, the logician's free will defies all principles of causality and rational intellectual activity. In such terms, a
computer programmed for random choice becomes the only organism
capable of absolute free will, the libertarian's concept of the ultimate
quality of the human mind.43
But the law, for all its absolutist proclamations, is not in fact that
impractical. It, above all social institutions, has been interested in the
down-to-earth, realistic elements of human behavior. Hence the law, in
determining moral responsibility and guilt and in assessing the severity
of punishment, painstakingly analyzes the determinants of the crime. It
is interesting to catalogue the wide variety of determinants which the law
implicitly and explicitly utilizes in assessing the moral accountability of
the defendant. Such determinants, as traditionally applied within the
criminal law, must number in the scores, if not in the hundreds. In some
instances the law refuses to recognize them or at least not officially
acknowledge that they are utilized in the judgment of responsibility.
Thus, a prejudiced juror might find a defendant guilty simply because the
defendant is a Negro. To such a juror, the defendant's color is considered
to be the determinant of the criminal act. To such a violently prejudiced
mind the cause of the criminal act is the defendant's race. No further
explanation is needed, and no amount of evidence to the contrary will
dissipate the juror's belief that the criminal act has been adequately explained and a proper judgment rendered.
The fact that the law does not overtly sanction or condone such irrationalities-but may conceal them under the form of a general verdict
43 One of the signs often proposed to distinguish Androids from men is that men are

endowed with "free-will." The only pragmatic test of free-will is that the behavioral
outcome is unpredictable. There is no difficulty at all in endowing computers with
randomizing devices which will make their response to a situation wholly unpredictable . . . and since their calculations are so rapid, their answers are in any case
unpredictable in point of fact. The proponent of such a test may feebly reply that,
although he cannot define it, he feels in his bones that free-will entails something
more than this. To this, no reasoned reply is possible, except to challenge him to
propose a test which can be applied to an Android which will prove that it does not
enjoy free-will . . . . The obstinate fact is . . . that there is no logically-sufficient condition which will determine whether a set of responses has been given by a human
being or by a suitably designed computer.
Taylor, "The Age of the Android," 21 Encounter 36, 44 (1963).
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-does not obviate the harsh fact that they exist. A racial attribute of the
defendant so becomes a determinant (in the mind of the decider) of the
criminal act. More representative of the legal process are those instances
when the law ascribes the cause of the crime to elements of human behavior described in a framework derived from ancient, common-sense
psychology. For example, a killing may be ascribed to the motive of
revenge or jealousy. Such a homicide is never attributed to a random
choice, a decision made in a psychological and circumstantial vacuum.
The law, in effect, says that the determinant (i.e., cause) of the slaying
was the emotional state of the killer. In a case of robbery, the crime may
be explained as caused by the greed and moral depravity of the defendant.
These attributes of the robber are thus regarded by the law as determinants of the crime. Common-sense psychology may go further and
attribute these criminal determinants to other determinants, in turn. The
moral depravity is considered to be the result of lack of religious belief
and training. The greed may be attributed to laziness; the laziness to
spoiling and indulgence in childhood; and these in their turn attributed
to the irresponsibility and sinfulness of the parents. Thus we have chains
of determinants-one event or attribute causing another until at the end
of the chain is the deed and its accompanying mens rea which define the
crime.
What does the law mean when it insists upon the element of free will
in such cases? Simply that the law believes that right up to the moment
of the deed other determinants might have been brought into operation
by the offender to alter the course of action. The defendant might have
exercised powers of volitional control and inhibited his acting upon his
motive of jealousy or greed or moral depravity. But even here, the law
accepts the realistic view of human nature that the act of volition has
determinants. Thus, the law may say that he did not wish to exercise
his volition because he was a sinful person and possessed an "abandoned
and malignant heart."
In fact, the law's theories and procedures as to assessment of criminal
responsibility seem to be essentially those of conventional psychology,
however much professional terminologies vary. The lawyer's historic
mainstay, common sense, is largely a recognition, classification, and
ordering of the determinants of the criminal act and the Mens rea. Thus
his concept of "insanity" as exculpating from or mitigating liability to
penal sanctions is essentially a recognition that "insanity" is one determinant of conduct. 44 This is true whether his test conforms to the verbal
44 As put by Hayek, supra note 31, at 77:

The complementarity of liberty and responsibility means that the argument for
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formula of M'Naghten,4 5 or M'Naghten as modified by the irresistible
impulse test,4 Durham,47 Currens,48 Baldi,4 9 Wells-Gorshen," the American Law Institute,5 or the California Insanity Commission. 2 Somnambulism53 and automatism5 4 may be forms of insanity which exculpate.
Historically age has been recognized as radically significant. "[F]rom
birth until seven years of age an infant is conclusively presumed incapable of committing any crime whatever. From seven to fourteen the
presumption continues, but is no longer conclusive, and grows gradually
weaker as the age advances towards fourteen;"6 5 under today's Juvenile
Court philosophy, youths well into adolescence may be wholly excused,
at least in theory, from criminal responsibility even for heinous acts. 6
Intoxication under varying formulae is a determinant which may tend
toward exculpation.57
The function of fear, duress, compulsion, or desperation as potential
determinants of conduct is recognized.58 Necessity or duress of circumstance, as when men are thrown from an overloaded life boat, may reduce
murder to manslaughter.59 Such a reduction frequently occurs under the
"rule of provocation" where killings are in the heat of passion. 60 Reasonliberty can apply only to those who can be held responsible. It cannot apply to
infants, idiots, or the insane. It presupposes that a person is capable of learning from
experience and of guiding his actions by knowledge thus acquired; it is invalid for
those who have not yet learned enough or are incapable of learning. A person whose
actions are fully determined by the same unchangeable impulses uncontrolled by
knowledge of the consequences or a genuine split personality, a schizophrenic, could
in -this sense not be held responsible, because his knowledge that he will be held
responsible could not alter his actions.
45 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
46 Perkins, Criminal Law 756-63 (1957); Keedy, "Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in

the Criminal Law," 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 956
47 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862
48 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751
49 United States ex. rel. Smith v. Baldi,

(1952).
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
(3d Cir. 1961).
192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 344 U.S.

561 (1953).
50 People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d

330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
51 Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
52 Report by California Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders 26 (1st
Report, July 7, 1962).
53 See Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558, 128 S.W. 871 (1910).
54 State v. McCullough, 114 Iowa 532, 87 N.W. 503 (1901).
55 Cal. Pen. Code § 26. See State v. George, 20 Del. (4Penne) 57 (Gen. Sess.), 54 At.
745 (1902).
56 People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 134 N.E.2d 197, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1956).
57 Cal. Pen. Code § 22; People v. Freedman, 4 Ill. 2d 414, 123 N.E.2d 317 (1954);
People v. Bartz, 342 Ill. 56, 173 N.E. 779 (1930); Gower v. State, 298 P.2d 461 (Okla.
Crim. 1956); Bentham, A Fragment on Government and an Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation 284 (Harrison ed. 1948).
58 Rhode Island Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.
1949); State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953); Cal. Pen. Code § 26; N.Y. Pen.
Law § 859.
59 United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
60 State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 50 AtI. 37 (1901); McHargue v. Commonwealth, 231

Ky. 82, 21 S.W.2d 115 (1929); State v. Robinson, 353 Mo. 934, 940, 185 S.W.2d 636, 640
(1945); Perkins, supra note 46, at 43.
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able apprehension of immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm
from an assailant legitimitizes determinants grounded in instincts of
self-defense.0 1
The law historically has recognized that traits 6f- character, reflected
in reputation, are relevant to the question of guilt of alleged offenses,
because such traits may help to show the likelihood -vel non of specific
acts."2 It is only a matter of policy that the prosecution is precluded from
a showing of bad traits until the defendant has proved good traits. 63
Recently one state's law has gone from the "crucible of the community
to the couch of the psychiatrist" in permitting a showing of character not
only from community reputation but from psychiatric- testimony of lack
of lustive tendencies of a perverted nature. 4
Foolishness or bad judgment may reduce culpability from criminal to
only civil concern; 65 the law's historic distinction between criminal and
civil negligence is fundamental. 6 And even where determinants of background or environment are irrelevant to ascertainment of guilt or innocence, they are often taken into account in fixing punishment. Although
economic necessity has never been accepted as a defense to a criminal
charge, it is-frequently invoked in mitigation of punishment. 7 In sentencing, the broadest kind of consideration is given to the circumstances of
the crime and the character and prior history of the defendant.6 8 Thus
military service is relevant.6 9 Wide scope is given the tribunal to appraise
70
the manner of man before it from his attitude and conduct in court.
It appears to us that the psychiatrist, the sociologist, and other behavioral scientists are doing essentially the same thing as the lawyer when
they offer their explanations of the criminal act. They too believe the
crime to be determined, and not a random act. If they are sincere believers in their own professional, scientific knowledge, they will sometimes prefer to think that the determinants which they emphasize provide
61 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921); People v. Ligouri, 284 N.Y. 309, 31
N.E.2d 37 (1940).

62 Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 363, 366 (1896); Carnley v. United States,
274 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1960).
63 McCormick, Evidence 333 (1954).
64 People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954). See Falknor & Steffen, "Evidence
of Character: From the 'Crucible of the Community' to the 'Couch of the Psychiatrist,'"
102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 980 (1954).
65 Heglin v. State, 236 Ind. 350, 140 N.E.2d 98 (1957).
66 State v. Tankersley, 172 N.C. 955, 90 S.E. 781 (1916).
67 See State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1933).
68 See Pennsylvania ex. rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) ; United States v. Finn,
136 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Blue v. State, 224 Ind. 394, 67 N.E.2d 377 (1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 840 (1947).
69 See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402-04, 253 P.2d 203, 207-08 (1953); compare
Grant v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 572, 576' (Ky. 1951).
70 See State v. Hutchison, 95 Iowa 566, 64 N.W. 610 (1895).
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a superior, a more authentic, explanation of the criminal mind and deed.
The psychiatrist may prefer to ascribe the crime to the hallucinations and
delusions of the defendant, which in turn are determined by the existence
of schizophrenia. Or the sociologist may emphasize the socio-economic
deprivation resulting from the offender having been raised in a highdelinquency slum area. The psychoanalyst may assert that what appears
to be greed (attributed by conventional morality to sinfulness and irresponsibility) may in actual fact be a form of compulsive anal-eroticism
which in turn is determined by peculiarities of the offender's toilet training in early infancy. Further, the offender's failure to exercise volition to
inhibit his illegal action may be attributed to a defect in ego structure
or to an intolerance of anxiety and frustration. He will thus conclude
that the defendant could not have exercised his powers of choice and
decision. The moral theologian is saying very much the same thing when
he insists that weakness of will is the determinant of the offender's failure
to exercise self-control.
Our point is this: the criminal law with its traditional common-sense
psychology derived from Greco-Judaic-Christian morality is not permanently separated from the modern behavioral sciences by the unbridgeable gulf of the free-will versus determinism dilemma. It is true
that at the present time the breach between law and science may be wide
in various contexts. But this is not necessarily due to irreconcilable difference. It is largely due to the inability of the behavioral sciences, especially
psychiatry, to come forth with convincing, demonstrations of the validity
of their selection of determinants of criminal behavior. Only too often
psychiatry can provide no answer whatsoever to the questions which
most concern the criminal lawY
Simply to ascribe the discrepancy between the historic morality concepts of the law and the behavioral concepts of psychiatry to the free-willdeterminism dilemma, and be done with it, is too easy a solution; it is
in fact an evasion. For the difference between the two disciplines' approaches proceeds not so much from irreconcilable philosophic principles
as from pragmatic judgment as to the particular chains of determinants
to emphasize. The law's emphasis is a function of common-sense psychology; psychiatry attempts to add deeper and more comprehensive
insights from systematized observation and study. The choice of emphasis, as well as the accompanying value judgment, is in itself partly determined by the differences in historical background and conceptual framework of law and science, although as earlier noted the emphases among
71 Diamond, "With Malice Aforethought," 2 Archives of Crim. Psychodynamics 1, 27
(1957); compare Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 493 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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determinants do not so much separate the lawyer and the psychiatrist as
such, as they divide men generally according to their individual philosophies and life experiences. In any event, neither law nor science proclaims
itself omniscient and immutable. Both law and science evolve; their
concepts and explanations of human behavior do change, sometimes
slowly, sometimes perhaps too rapidly to permit assimilation and crossfertalization of the two disciplines. Instances exist where the law has been
willing to modify some of its basic traditional views as the result of
insights from modern behavioral science, despite the fact that often the
views of psychiatry are uncertain and difficult to prove objectively. 2
The behavioral sciences have values to offer to the criminal law. The
law can be taught that in some instances the explanations of crime
provided by psychiatry and sociology may be superior to the traditional
explanations of common sense. They are superior when they explain more;
when they account for more facets of human behavior in more rational
terms; when they open up new possibilities for investigation and experimentation, which in turn may lead to greater knowledge and more effective practical solutions to urgent social problems. Further, the behavioral
sciences can sometimes demonstrate that what passes for traditional
common sense is nothing but superstition which has become so familiar
through centuries of habituation that it has become a natural truth only
because no one thinks of questioning it.
As pointed out above, the law's acknowledgment of determinants of
crime depends largely upon society's goals in the administration of criminal justice. It seems reasonable to hope that if psychiatry and other
behavioral sciences increasingly validate particular determinants beyond
the control of the offender as causes of criminal conduct, society and
hence the law may be educated to a correspondingly growing willingness
(i) to diminish the infliction of pain as an act of institutionalized social
revenge upon the evildoer, for if "to know all is to forgive all," increasing
knowledge of the determinants should aid us to hold in leash the aggressive and retributive instincts; (ii) to pretermit the essentially theological
function of adjudicating ultimate moral responsibility, concentrating its
limited human intelligence and energies on rehabilitating the offender and
restoring him to the community while constructing as best it can the social
defenses against crime.
Often the law retains its time-honored phrases, maxims, and definitions
72 Doubtless the outstanding illustration is the abandonment of the rule that youths
past 14 years of age are responsible as adults; and the substitution of the principle under
Juvenile Court acts that juvenile delinquency is not criminal (except where there is discretion in the prosecutor or tribunal to elect to prosecute as with an adult), but instead
is conduct evoking therapy by the state as parens patriae.
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even as it evolves through- changing the operational meaning of its words
and phrases." Because the words, themselves, remain fixed for centuries,
the behavioral scientist is often unaware of the vast changes in the law
which have been accomplished. 4
The behavioral sciences can assist the law further to evolve the operational meanings of its time-honored words. The definitions of such terms
as intent, malice, premeditation, insanity, responsibility, depravity, turpitude, negligence, passion, and many kindred words in our penal codes
seem to be largely products of the ethos of the generation, as are "due
process" and "equal protection." 5 Good could be accomplished by evolving newer and more insightful meanings for these words and phrases
which would reflect advances in our scientific knowledge of human
behavior, when in fact there have been advances. If the contemporary
evolution of newer meanings for ancient words produces changes in basic
concepts, will not the process accord with historic methods of the mind's
development? The behavioral sciences, especially psychiatry, can contribute to such a process of evolutionary development.
Only those who shut their eyes to recent changes of the criminal law
can fail to see how much has already been accomplished-how thoroughly
certain modern scientific concepts have already been integrated into the
law.7" The philosophic problem of free will versus determinism can safely
be relegated to the logicians who perhaps will always have to classify it
in that hopeless category of questions which can never be answered
simply because they are not asked in a logical form which permits a
logical answer. Further theological elucidation may always have to acknowledge an impenetrable mystery. In the meanwhile, the behavioral
scientist can continue his explorations of human behavior and feel confident that his discoveries will be utilized by the criminal law in proportion as their significance can be meaningfully communicated to the legal
mind and their utilitarian value can be demonstrated.
But the behavioral scientist will not advance the ball by pretending to
know what is not known or by dramatic incantations against freedom of
the will. Until he is able demonstrably to remove the veil still enveloping
the unknown, i.e., the precise operation of choice and decision after the
73 E.g., the meaning of "malice aforethought" in the definition of murder has radically
changed. Diamond, "With Malice Aforethought," supra note 71; Perkins, supra note 46,
at 30.
74 California still applies the M'Naghten rule, supra note 3, in its original language in
the determination of the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill. Yet the meaning of the
words spoken in 1843 has been substantially altered by recent decisions, e.g., People v. Wolff,
61 Cal. 2d 123, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
75 Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76 See, e.g., the cases cited in notes 1, 13, 14, 15, and 48 supra.
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determinants have expended themselves-a mystery before which philosophy, theology, and the psychological sciences still bow humble heads

-it behooves him as it does all men to acknowledge the limitations of his
expertise. To demonstrate that the human drama is played on a set stage,
is not to disprove variation in the quality of the dramatic art. To know in
part is not to know all.77
As put by Ryle, The Concept of Mind 80-81 (1964):
The fears expressed by some moral philosophers that the advance of the natural
sciences diminishes the field within which the moral virtues can be exercised rests
on the assumption that there is some contradiction in saying that one and the same
occurrence is governed both by mechanical laws and by moral principles, an assumption
as baseless as the assumption that a golfer cannot at once conform to the laws of
ballistics and obey the rules of golf and play with elegance and skill.
77

